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of Institutionalization 
Alan M. Garber and Thomas E. MaCurdy 
In this paper, we explore the relation between the duration of nursing home 
admissions and the source of payment for nursing home care. This subject has 
assumed critical importance as a growing number of private insurers begin to 
offer long-term care insurance, millions of  middle-aged and elderly Ameri- 
cans plan for future long-term care needs, and policymakers debate the role 
that government should play in  financing, delivering, and regulating long- 
term care. 
Both private and public initiatives for financing long-term care need accu- 
rate projections of  utilization, but few studies have examined the effects of 
insurance on utilization. The size of  the insurance subsidy effect on utiliza- 
tion, or moral hazard, is not readily inferred from observed price variation. It 
is notoriously difficult to gauge the price of nursing home care faced by con- 
sumers of  this service, in part because price variation reflects differences in 
the characteristics of  nursing homes (e.g., the quality of  nursing services, 
meals,  and housing  amenities).  In  the absence of  comprehensive, reliable 
price data or of  direct measures of  the effects of alternate financing mecha- 
nisms on long-term care utilization, studies of the relation between payment 
source and utilization provide important clues to the likely consequences of 
changing long-term care insurance benefits. 
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The measure of utilization that we examine is the length of  each nursing 
home admission. While information about the duration of spells is a key com- 
ponent, additional information is needed to complete any comprehensive pic- 
ture of nursing home utilization.  Comprehensive measures of  utilization  (or 
cumulative duration) also require information about both the likelihood that a 
spell will occur at all and the frequency of readmission. In the long-term care 
literature,  recidivism is recognized  as a frequent event (Lewis, Cretin,  and 
Kane 1985). The length of an individual spell has an entirely different inter- 
pretation if it is only one of a series of admissions rather than a unique occur- 
rence. 
Nursing home utilization also depends on the mode of exit, which in most 
duration analyses is of little concern. In other medical contexts, the nature of 
exit may have minimal significance because there is only one way a spell (of 
an illness, e.g.) may terminate (in death); in economic contexts, even if there 
is more than one way to end a spell (of unemployment, e.g.), the nature of the 
exit may be of secondary interest.  The type of  exit from nursing homes, in 
contrast, has substantive economic and welfare implications. Nursing home 
admissions  terminate  in return  to the  community,  transfer to a hospital,  or 
death. Although the type of discharge clearly matters  to the patient, it also 
affects  future  long-term  care  utilization  and  overall  health  expenditures. 
Transfer to a hospital, for example, is often a costly interruption in a lengthy 
nursing home stay, while discharge to the community may signal resumption 
of independent living. The length of a nursing home spell, if it terminates in 
hospital admission, may be short in relation to overall utilization. To  accom- 
modate  these  phenomena, we  complement  the  analysis  of  duration  distri- 
butions with an investigation of the association  between the probabilities  of 
alternate modes of exit and several other factors, including personal character- 
istics, payment source, and length of the nursing home admission. 
We investigate these issues by analyzing data on a sample of frail, disabled, 
and otherwise vulnerable elderly men and women who were believed to be 
likely to enter a nursing home. They were enrolled in the National Long-Term 
Care (Channeling) Demonstration, a randomized controlled trial of case man- 
agement as a deterrent to institutionalization. While this sample is not repre- 
sentative of  elderly Americans  generally, it represents a group of  particular 
interest:  persons  who  are expected  to consume  a disproportionate  share of 
long-term care and who are likely to be excluded from the purchase of private 
long-term care insurance.  If associations between payment source and dura- 
tion patterns are significant in this sample, the relation in the general popula- 
tion  might  be  stronger,  particularly  if  the  demand  for  nursing  home  care 
among Channeling participants is inelastic. 
In the following section, we describe the current environment for financing 
nursing home care. After discussing the challenges facing the development of 
private long-term care insurance, we review salient characteristics of govern- 
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describes the data used in the empirical analysis. The third section describes 
the empirical model used to analyze the duration of nursing home spells and 
how it accommodates the duration dependence that some forms of health in- 
surance promote. Results of  the empirical analysis of nursing home duration 
and exit type are presented in the fourth section. We conclude with a discus- 
sion of the implications of this analysis for the design of long-term care insur- 
ance. 
8.1  How Nursing Home Care Is Financed 
Three payment sources accounted for nearly all nursing home expenditures 
in 1986: Medicaid (41.4 percent), Medicare (1.6 percent), and direct private 
payment (51.0 percent). Private health insurance paid for 0.8 percent, and 
miscellaneous government sources were responsible for the remainder (U.  S. 
Department of Health and Human Services 1988, 161). Much of the current 
interest in long-term care policies is a response to perceived shortcomings of 
existing financing arrangements. 
Perhaps the most notable feature of long-term care financing in the United 
States is the minor role played by private long-term care insurance. In contrast 
to the ubiquitous presence of both privately and publicly funded insurance for 
other forms of health care, long-term care insurance has paid for a small pro- 
portion of  total long-term care expenditures in this country. The failure to 
develop a thriving market for private insurance reflects, in part, insurers’ vul- 
nerability to adverse selection and moral hazard. Insurers fear that adverse 
selection is likely because potential purchasers of insurance are better able to 
know whether they have an unusually high risk of needing long-term care than 
the insurer. Although there are several ways to deter adverse selection-such 
as restrictive benefits or a premium structure that encourages enrollment years 
before the need for long-term care is likely to arise-adverse  selection is less 
problematic for government insurers than for private firms. 
Like private insurers, government programs are also subject to moral haz- 
ard. In routine health insurance, moral hazard refers to the “overuse” of cov- 
ered services. The effective subsidy for covered services can be so large that 
the price facing the patient or consumer is negligible. Even though moderate 
copayments may not be sufficient to curtail the demand for covered services, 
at least one important characteristic of  conventional health services limits 
their utilization: utility derives not from the consumption of the service itself 
but from the improvement in health that it produces. The marginal benefit of 
most health interventions eventually becomes negative; the prospect of  mini- 
mal or no health benefit from uncomfortable medical procedures deters gross 
overuse. 
In contrast, long-term care includes housing, food services, and personal 
services as well as specialized nursing care. Because these services are poten- 
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tally impaired persons who are the intended recipients, long-term care is par- 
ticularly likely to be subject to moral hazard. Insurers often implicitly ration 
care by setting medical criteria for reimbursement.  However, if they hope to 
limit the effect of moral hazard by requiring interviews and physical exami- 
nations as a condition for reimbursement,  they may be stymied by the primi- 
tive state of measurement of the “need”  for long-term care. These measure- 
ments  consist  of  functional  and  health  status  indicators,  along  with 
characterizations of the availability of social supports. The need for long-term 
care is determined in large part by self-reported disabilities or reports of fam- 
ily members, who may have an incentive to misrepresent  the severity of the 
impairment when seeking to obtain coverage for desired services. In the ab- 
sence of reliable objective indicators of disability, it is not surprising that mea- 
sures of  the need for long-term care are rarely as reproducible and credible as 
the laboratory tests and physical signs of illness that are used to evaluate the 
need  for acute medical  services.  Consequently,  non-price rationing  is not a 
fully satisfactory response to moral hazard. 
Although  they  usually  lack  private  long-term  care insurance,  nearly  all 
older  Americans  participate  in  Medicare.  If  they  are  admitted  to  nursing 
homes and meet several criteria, Medicare will reimburse part of the cost. The 
Medicare Catastrophic Act, which was repealed before its full implementa- 
tion, would have extended the duration of benefits and eased reimbursement 
requirements but would not have altered the Medicare nursing home benefit 
substantially.  Medicare  contributes  to the payments  for a stay in  a nursing 
home only if the nursing home is a certified skilled nursing facility. This elim- 
inates most custodial care, which does not require the high level of  skilled 
nursing care and rehabilitation services that characterize certified skilled nurs- 
ing facilities. In addition, five conditions must be met before a patient’s stay 
in a skilled nursing facility could generate any reimbursement: (1) a patient 
must have been in a hospital at least three consecutive days prior to transfer to 
the skilled nursing facility; (2) admission to the skilled nursing facility must 
occur within thirty days after hospital discharge; (3) admission to the skilled 
nursing facility must be for the treatment of the same condition as was treated 
in the hospital; (4)  the admission must be certified by a physician; and (5) the 
stay must not  be disapproved  by  a utilization  review committee.  If  all five 
conditions are met, Medicare will contribute for up to one hundred  days of 
care in each benefit period.  Medicare pays the full charges for covered ser- 
vices during the first twenty days in a skilled nursing facility. However, the 
copayments during the twenty-first through hundredth days are substantial; in 
1986, Medicare paid for all but $61.50 each day of the covered charges for 
days 21-100. 
Thus, despite  near  universal  participation,  Medicare  pays  for  relatively 
little nursing home care because its coverage rules are so restrictive.  Eligibil- 
ity for Medicaid  is much more limited,  yet Medicaid pays for a substantial 
fraction of U.S. nursing home care. To be eligible for Medicaid benefits,  an 253  Payment Source and Episodes of  Institutionalization 
individual must meet income and asset tests or have health expenses that are 
large in relation to income. Because Medicaid is a combined federal and state 
program, eligibility criteria and benefit structure vary from one state to an- 
other (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1985). In most states, 
Medicaid does not limit the duration of benefit, nor are nursing home benefits 
restricted to stays in skilled nursing facilities. 
Although Medicaid typically requires no copayments, its reimbursement 
levels can be well below private pay charges for nursing home care. Conse- 
quently, there are usually delays before a Medicaid patient can be admitted to 
a nursing home. Furthermore, Medicaid patients who are transferred to hos- 
pitals risk losing their place in the nursing home if the hospital stay is not 
brief. 
There would be narrower interest in Medicaid if it covered only the nursing 
home stays of  impoverished older persons. However, Medicaid often serves 
as a long-term care insurer for middle-class elderly. This is a consequence of 
the “medically needy” category of Medicaid eligibility. 
Besides  standard  income-based criteria  for  Medicaid  enrollment,  most 
states have a provision that enables individuals who “spend down” to qualify 
for Medicaid, even if  they do not meet other Medicaid eligibility require- 
ments. Persons can obtain Medicaid benefits if  their health expenses are so 
large that their remaining income is only one-third higher than the poverty 
level. Institutionalization is the most common reason for such large expendi- 
tures, at least in part because the average monthly charges for nursing homes 
in  1985 were $1,456. This figure includes “no-charge’’ residents along with 
paying  residents  (U.S.  Department of  Health  and  Human  Services  1988, 
163). The specific rules for each state are described elsewhere (U.S. Depart- 
ment of  Health and  Human  Services  1985). Although Medicaid  rules are 
stringent, loopholes and uneven enforcement enable many elderly Medicaid 
recipients to conserve assets (Kidwell 1988). 
Private pay  patients would ordinarily pay  full charges for nursing home 
care, but as they approach “medically indigent” health expenditures they may 
face a complex price schedule. For persons expecting to “spend down” to 
Medicaid eligibility, the price of a day in a nursing home will eventually fall 
to zero. The implicit deductible is a function of the patient’s assets and income 
and varies across states. The “spend-down’’ is important only for long stays, 
but it is so frequent that it explains much of Medicaid’s large expenditures for 
nursing home care. In  1986, the 14.0 percent of Medicaid recipients aged 65 
and over accounted for 36.9 percent of Medicaid payments (U.S. Department 
of  Health and Human Services 1988, 177); 36.3 percent of  Medicaid’s total 
expenditures were for nursing home care (U.S. Department of  Health and 
Human Services 1988, 174). 
If  only because nursing home patients face different price schedules under 
each arrangement, the duration of  nursing home admissions may  differ ac- 
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increases at twenty  and one hundred days if  covered by  Medicare.  Conse- 
quently, there  may  be jumps in the discharge rates  near  days 20 and  100. 
Patients covered by Medicaid pay nothing, but because the nursing home re- 
ceives less money for Medicaid patients than for private pay patients, the pro- 
viders  may  influence  discharge  rates.  The time  pattern  of  discharge  rates 
would be less clear, but because Medicare patients are primarily admitted for 
posthospital care, and because Medicaid patients are not paying for their nurs- 
ing home care, we would expect Medicaid admissions to be longer. For other 
payers, the patient usually bears the full cost until approaching “spend-down.” 
The private pay patients may be a very heterogeneous group. They may in- 
clude some people who are extremely disabled and would be expected to stay 
in a nursing home for a long time but whose financial resources exceed the 
Medicaid levels. They may also include individuals who are expected to have 
short stays in a nursing home but whose admissions do not qualify for Medi- 
care reimbursement. The duration of nursing home stays for this group would 
seem likely to be intermediate between Medicare and Medicaid stays. 
Because  Medicare  finances  posthospitalization  nursing  home  care,  we 
would expect frequent hospital readmissions, particularly after the implemen- 
tation of Medicare’s  Prospective Payment System. Prospective payment  for 
hospital care gave hospitals an incentive to discharge patients early, and there 
have  been  widespread  complaints  that  Medicare  patients  were  being  dis- 
charged “quicker and sicker.” In addition,  the Prospective  Payment  System 
encouraged  substitution of  outpatient  services for inpatient  care. Thus, the 
average Medicare patient admitted to a hospital  after implementation  of  the 
new system was sicker than before since healthy Medicare recipients received 
more of  their care as outpatients.  Although  these changes imply  that more 
Medicare patients would be discharged from hospitals to nursing homes than 
before,  there was not a surge in total Medicare nursing home expenditures. 
Inasmuch as Medicare inpatients were sicker and discharged earlier, we ex- 
pect patients transferred from the hospital to nursing homes to be readmitted 
to hospitals at a high rate. 
8.2  Data for the Analysis of Nursing Home Spells 
Our data were obtained as part of the Channeling Demonstration, a large- 
scale randomized controlled trial that was organized in  1980 by the Depart- 
ment of Health and Human  Services in order to test  an intervention  called 
“case management .” This intervention gave professional personnel the respon- 
sibility for arranging and coordinating services for impaired elderly “clients .” 
According to its advocates, case management would decrease nursing home 
utilization  and improve  the  long-term  care of  the  elderly. The Channeling 
Demonstration  tested  this hypothesis  by  enrolling high-risk  elderly partici- 
pants at ten  sites around  the country. The intervention  did not significantly 
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sures of health, so our analyses do not incorporate estimates of  the effect of 
case management. We  have described the data elsewhere (Garber and Ma- 
Curdy 1990); the entire April 1988 issue of HeuZfh Services Research is de- 
voted to the evaluation of the Channeling Demonstration. 
To  participate in  the study, an  individual had to be at least 65 years old, 
suffer limitations in several basic activities of daily living or instrumental ac- 
tivities of daily living, and have unmet needs, meaning that because of func- 
tional impairments he or she required help with at least two categories of 
service for six months. Because this was primarily a study of disabled elderly 
people living in the community, persons who were in nursing homes at the 
time of  enrollment were included only if  discharge was likely within three 
months. The sample meeting these criteria was relatively old (mean age 80), 
poorly educated, poor, and disabled. 
Extensive baseline data  were  collected from  5,626 individuals between 
September 1982 and July 1983. Follow-up interviews were conducted at six, 
twelve, and eighteen months following the enrollment period. 
Severe disability and the presence of multiple chronic illnesses were re- 
flected in very high mortality rates. In the first year of study, 26 percent of all 
Channeling participants died, and about  16 percent entered nursing homes. 
Hospitalization was frequent and sometimes prolonged. In the first six months 
of the study, hospital use averaged thirteen days, and approximately 45 per- 
cent of the participants were admitted to a hospital at least once (Wooldridge 
and  Schore 1988, 119). Monthly health care costs varied among sites and 
between  intervention and  control  groups,  ranging  from  about  $1,330  to 
$1,879. 
A large percentage of participants were admitted to nursing homes, often 
for repeated stays. Nearly a thousand participants had at least one admission, 
292 had at least two spells, ninety-three had at least three, and twenty had 
four or more admissions. Medicare paid for at least part of  the costs for 43 
percent of the first spells, Medicaid paid for 26 percent, and other (private) 
payers were responsible for 3 1 percent. The proportion covered by  Medicare 
or others fell steadily with admission number; Medicaid was the payer for 50 
percent of third and 60  percent of fourth admissions. 
A subset of the many personal characteristics recorded as part of the Chan- 
neling  study appears as the explanatory variables in  our analyses. We  de- 
scribed the association between several characteristics and cumulative utili- 
zation in a previous paper (Garber and MaCurdy  1990); we  found that the 
presence of a severe impairment in an activity of daily living (ADL) and Med- 
icaid coverage were closely associated with increased risk of entering a nurs- 
ing home. Medicaid patients who were admitted to nursing homes were less 
likely to terminate an admission by  death. Gender was also important; men 
were much more likely than women to end a nursing home admission by 
dying. These previous estimates were based only on data on cumulative nurs- 
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The estimates we  report here are based on additional data that include the 
dates of admission to and discharge from nursing homes, allowing a richer 
empirical  specification  and a  more precise  characterization  of  the roles  of 
payer source and duration effects. The explanatory variables we use include 
the payment source at entry to the nursing home, the source of the admission 
(hospital or community), gender, age, and the presence of severe impairment 
in  at  least  one ADL.  Summary statistics  for key  variables,  for the  entire 
sample of nursing home admissions and by  payer type, appear in table 8.1. 
The variables include ENTRY, which takes the value of  zero if  an individual 
enters a nursing home from the community and a value of  one if the subject 
Table 8.1  Summary  Statistics 
Variable  Mean  SD 
Entire sample of spells (N= 1,396) 
ENTRY 
AGE 
 AGE^ 
SEX 
SVADL 
MEDICARE 
MEDICAID 
OTHER 
SPELL LENGTH (days) 
RIGHT CENSORED SPELLS 
Medicare subsample (N =  543) 
ENTRY 
AGE 
 AGE^ 
SEX 
SVADL 
SPELL LENGTH (days) 
RIGHT CENSORED SPELLS 
Medicaid subsample of spells (N =  427) 
ENTRY 
AGE 
 AGE^ 
SEX 
SVADL 
SPELL LENGTH (days) 
RIGHT CENSORED SPELLS 
Other payment source (N=  426) 
ENTRY 
AGE 
 AGE^ 
SEX 
SVADL 
SPELL LENGTH (days) 
RIGHT CENSORED SPELLS 
,706 
80.594 
6,552.200 
,250 
,760 
.389 
,306 
,305 
99.225 
,220 
.924 
80.039 
6,462 SO0 
,267 
.759 
55.692 
,908 
.639 
80.958 
6,611.800 
,194 
.785 
133.620 
,611 
,493 
80.937 
6,606.800 
,284 
,737 
120.230 
.786 
.46 
7.54 
1,213.80 
.43 
.43 
107.85 
.41 
.29 
7.50 
1,203.70 
.44 
.43 
74.23 
.29 
.49 
7.59 
1,228.90 
.40 
.41 
127.13 
.49 
SO 
7.49 
1,204.70 
.45 
.44 
104.18 
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enters from a hospital; AGE and AGE* the age and square of age at admission; 
SEX, which  is set to one for men  and zero for women; and  SVADL,  which 
equals one if a severe ADL limitation is present and zero otherwise. 
8.3  An Empirical Framework 
To  address the issues raised  in the introduction, we propose two sets of 
empirical specifications: one that describes how the length of stay in nursing 
homes varies by payment source and a second that describes the link between 
financing sources and the mode of exit from nursing home stays. In the sub- 
sequent formulations, we envision a person as residing  in any one of  four 
states at a given time: community residence (state c); hospitalization (state h); 
nursing home occupancy (state n); and death (state d).  The number of days 
composing a spell in state n represents the length of a nursing home stay. On 
termination of a spell, an individual exits to state c, h, or d. Thus, our empir- 
ical requirements translate into introducing specifications that capture the re- 
lation between payment source and spell length in state n and the connection 
between payment source and the probability of moving to state c, h, or d when 
an exit from state n occurs. 
8.3.1  Duration Distributions, Survivor Functions, and Hazard Rates 
A duration distribution characterizes the likelihood that an individual ex- 
periences a given number of days of continuous residence in a nursing home 
given admission into the institution. A formulation for such a distribution is 
given by 
(1)  AT) = S(7 - 1) [l -  P(x,  ?)I, 
with 
T- 1 
S(7 - 1)  = n  P(X, t), 
I=  I 
where P(X,  r) represents a probability that conditions on the variables X and r. 
The functionfi~)  specifies the probability  that duration in a status will last 
exactly 7 days for individuals falling into a category characterized by  attri- 
butes X who are known to have entered the status at some time. The quantity 
S(7 - l), the survivor function, represents the probability that individuals in 
this category will experience at least T - 1 days in the status. For the problem 
of concern in this analysis, 7  corresponds to the duration of  a nursing home 
spell, and the covariates X include factors influencing the length of  spells, 
such as financing sources. 
In the specification of the probabilities P(X, t),  the variables X are set at the 
time of entry into the status, and the variable t represents the level of duration 
accumulated up to the point of evaluation. The literature terms the influence 258  Alan M. Garber and Thomas E. MaCurdy 
oft  on P “duration dependence.” If P(X, r) increases (decreases) as a function 
of I, then positive (negative) duration dependence is said to exist. 
Proposing a specification forf  and S requires the acquisition of some basic 
information concerning the appropriate functional form of  the probabilities 
P(X, r).  Two aspects of this functional form are critical to specification. The 
first involves the nature of duration dependence applicable for the data under 
investigation, which primarily determines how  P  varies with t. The second 
concerns the possibility that central features of  duration dependence change 
as the values of X change. To account for this possibility, the specification of 
P must allow interaction between X and t to capture the underlying nature of 
the relation. 
Plotting hazard rates is a popular mode for presenting information about the 
character of duration dependence. A hazard rate is defined as follows: 
(3)  H(7) =  = 1 -  P(x,  7). 
S(7 - 1) 
Formally, the hazard rate H(T)  represents the probability that a spell terminates 
on day T given that this spell has already lasted T - 1 days. Consequently, it 
shows the fraction of  the institutional population who,  having been  in  the 
nursing home for T - 1 days will leave on the 7th day of their spell. Plotting 
H(T)  against T indicates how P(X,  7)  varies as a function of 7. 
8.3.2  An Empirical Specification for Spell Lengths in Nursing Homes 
Graphs of  hazard rates reveal that empirical specifications of the probabili- 
ties P(X, t) must  admit nonmonotonic duration dependence and  allow  the 
form of this dependence to vary according to the attributes X.  Accounting for 
such  features  rules  out  “proportional  hazards ,”  one  of  the  most  popular 
choices in the duration literature, as a specification for P  We require a formu- 
lation for P  that admits flexibility both in the functional form for duration 
dependence and in the way in which this dependence varies for different val- 
ues of the covariates  X. 
The following specification for the probability P(X, t)  has these properties: 
(4) 
1 
1 + @,P+nc’.x*.ol,’  P(X, t) = 
where XI  and X, are vectors of  variables made up of  the covariates X, p is a 
parameter vector, 
K 
(5) 
@,(t)  denotes the cumulative distribution function of a normal random variable 
possessing mean p,  and variance of,  and the a,,’s in  (5)  represent parameter 
vectors. Specification (4) models P as a logit function. 
g(t7  x,, a)  = c  [@,,ct> -  @,-,(t)lbO,X* + t  *  a,,  + r2a2J, 
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The function g(t,  X,,  a)  determines the duration properties of nursing home 
admissions.  The presence of X, in g allows duration dependence to vary ac- 
cording to all the attributes included in X,.  To describe the characteristics of 
g, suppose for the moment that X,  consists only of an intercept,  j,  so 
aoJX2  + rq, + t2a2,  = a,, + a,,t + a,,t2. 
The presence of the cumulative density functions in (5) permits us to incor- 
porate spline features in g so that the quadratic polynomial aoJ  + aIJt  + azf 
represents g over only a prespecified range of t. In particular, suppose that we 
wish to set g = aol  + a,,t + a,,t2  for values of r between zero and r*  and to 
set g  = a,* + a,,t  + a2,tZ  for values oft  between t* and some upper bound 
i. To  create a specification of g that satisfies the property, assign K  = 2 in (5); 
fix the three means determining the cumulative density functions as k, = 0, 
p, = t*, k2 = t;  and pick very small values for the three standard deviations 
a,, uI,  and (T,. These choices for the p’s and the u’s imply that the quantity 
@,(Q -  @&)  equals one over the range (0, t*) and zero elsewhere and that 
the quantity  @,(t) -  @,(t)  equals one over the range (t*,  i) and zero else- 
where. Accordingly, g possesses the desired property. Further, g(r,  X,,  a)  is 
differentiable in t.  With the values of the p, and the u, set in advance of esti- 
mation, g(t,  X,, a)  is strictly linear in the parameters a  and in known functions 
of t and X,.  One can control where each spline or polynomial begins and ends 
by adjusting the values of the  k’s. Also, one can control how quickly each 
spline cuts in and out by adjusting the values of the u’s, with higher values 
providing for a more gradual and smoother transition from one polynomial to 
the next. 
In the subsequent estimation dealing with nursing home spells, we pick a 
specification  of  g(t, X,,  a)  by  setting  K  = 3  in  (5), with  po = -  1.0, 
(T,  = .5, kJ.,  = 15, (T, = 5, k,  = 50, u2 = 5, and k3  equal to a numerical 
value  that  exceeds  the  highest  spell  length.  Thus,  the  polynomial 
aolX,  + tall + t’a,,  determines g  from zero to about  fifteen  days. After 
fifteen days, g switches to the polynomial ao2X, + ta,, + t2a2,,  which deter- 
mines its value until about fifty days. Over the interval from day 40 to day 60, 
g again switches to become the polynomial  ao3X2  + ta,, + Pa,,,  where it 
remains for the highest values of duration. The empirical analysis estimates 
the a  coefficients. The following empirical analysis considers several specifi- 
cations of the explanatory variables incorporated in X,  and X,. 
8.3.3  Empirical Specifications for Exit Probabilities 
A second aspect of  our empirical analysis characterizes the routes by which 
individuals exit from nursing home spells. We seek to identify the connection 
between payment sources and the likelihood of following various exit alter- 
natives.  On the termination of a spell in a nursing home or, equivalently,  in 
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pital, which we designate as states d, c, and h, respectively. Define the prob- 
abilities 
(6) 
for the probability of exit from state n to state i after experiencing a spell of T 
days in state n. Formally, the quantity Pr(n +  i) represents the probability that 
an individual moves from state n to residency in state i conditional on ending 
a spell of T days in state n and on the covariates X. By incorporating indicators 
of payment sources in X,  one can relate the circumstances under which a nurs- 
ing home stay ends to the financing sources used to fund this stay. 
We parameterize these probabilities using a multinomial logit specification. 
Subsequent empirical formulations take the form 
Pr(n --t i) E Pr(n +  i I T,  x),  i = c,  h, d, 
(7)  i = c, h, d. 
.el 
C’ 
Pr(n --t  i)  = 
i=c.h,d 
The vector Z  contains polynomials and interactions involving the duration 
variable T and the elements of the covariates X. 
8.4  Empirical Results 
In this section, we describe the empirical relation linking the length of nurs- 
ing home stays, the circumstances under which spells end, and the financing 
sources used to (partially) fund the spells. The analysis initially describes the 
estimation of duration distributions f(~),  with covariates incorporated to con- 
trol for demographic characteristics and health conditions. After discussing 
the implications of  the empirical findings for spell lengths, we consider the 
mode of exit from institutions. 
8.4.1 
To  estimate the distribution f(~),  we  apply conventional maximum likeli- 
hood methods of the sort found in duration analysis to compute values for the 
coefficients p and  ci  appearing in  specification (4). Our sample consists of 
observations on nursing home spell lengths. Our procedure accounts for right 
censoring when spells are interrupted. 
We  estimate distinct models for three types of payment sources: (1) spells 
financed by Medicare at admission; (2) spells financed by Medicaid at admis- 
sion; and (3) spells financed by  private funds at admission. If Medicare paid 
any part of the nursing home costs, it was considered to be the payer. If Med- 
icaid, but not Medicare, paid any of the costs of the admission at the time of 
entry, Medicaid was considered the payer. “Other payer” was considered to be 
the payment source if neither Medicare nor Medicaid contributed to the nurs- 
ing home payments at the time of admission. An individual who “spent down” 
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to Medicaid eligibility during a nursing home admission would not be consid- 
ered  a Medicaid  patient  during that admission  since Medicaid  was  not  the 
payer at the outset. 
Table 8.2 presents  coefficient estimates and standard errors for AT)  asso- 
ciated with the three payment sources. The results reported correspond to a 
specification of P(X, t)  given by (4) in which X2 = 1 and XI includes ENTRY, 
SEX,  AGE,   AGE^, and SVADL. Before reaching this specification, we explored a 
number of formulations. Likelihood ratio tests at conventional levels of  sig- 
nificance indicate acceptance of the restriction that the variables ENTRY,  SEX, 
and SVADL  can  be  excluded individually  and jointly  as components  of  X,. 
From our examination of a variety of candidates for inclusion in X,, no other 
variables appear to alter the form of duration dependence after accounting for 
payment source. 
For Medicare spells, none of the coefficients of the covariates in XI  reaches 
conventional levels of statistical significance. For Medicaid spells, AGE is sta- 
tistically significant, and SEX is of  borderline significance. For payment from 
other sources, SEX is statistically significant, and SVADL is of borderline sig- 
Table 8.2  Parameter Estimates from Duration Analyses (standard errors in 
parentheses) 
Variable  MEDICARE  MEDICAID  OTHER 
ENTRY 
AGE 
AGE* 
SEX 
SVADL 
a01 
a11 
Q2I 
a02 
a12 
a22 
,17083 
(. 17971) 
,07680 
(. 1099  1) 
-  .00058 
(.00069) 
.08427 
(.10677) 
,08176 
(.  1063  1) 
-7.02882 
(4.35469) 
,12874 
(.09200) 
-  .00678 
(.00607) 
-5.661  12 
(4.34942) 
-  .02220 
(.01354) 
.ooooo 
(.OOOoo) 
-6.65183 
(4.35140) 
-  .00379 
(.00131) 
,06436 
(.13300) 
-  .I1256 
(.01600) 
.oOo70 
(.00013) 
,28961 
(. 1547  I) 
,07688 
( .I6030) 
-  ,94959 
(.55863) 
.01401 
(.05454) 
,00000 
(.00048) 
.m 
(.04839) 
-  ,01990 
(.01720) 
.00OOo 
(.ooooO) 
-  ,77403 
(.57684) 
(.00091) 
-  ,00280 
.03396 
.01195 
(.15604) 
- .m 
(.00098) 
.36174 
(. 13246) 
.I9968 
(. 12979) 
-  6.82207 
(6.1759) 
,21060 
(.20456) 
-  .oO606 
(.01180) 
-  5.7  1846 
(6.23813) 
-  ,00784 
(.01995) 
.o0000 
(.oooW 
-6.11224 
(6.18819) 
.ooo49 
(.00080) 
(.11121) 262  Alan M. Garber and Thomas E. MaCurdy 
nificance. More of  the information pertinent to the duration of  the spell ap- 
pears to be embedded in payment source than in these covariates. 
8.4.2  Implications of the Findings for Duration 
To  summarize the influence of various explanatory variables on the duration 
of nursing home admissions, tables 8.3A-8.3C  report percentiles associated 
with the survivor functions for alternate values of the five basic characteristics 
used as covariates in the model, by payment source. In each of these specifi- 
cations, payment source is fully interacted with the covariates. Listed in the 
first row of each set of results, the baseline case is a man, age 75, who has no 
severe impairment in basic activities of daily living and who was transferred 
from a hospital to the nursing home. Subsequent rows of each table show the 
Table 8.3  Quantiles of Nursing Home Duration 
A. Days in Nursing Home, for Admissions Covered Initially by Medicare 
Percentile 
Specification  10th  25th  50th  75th  90th 
~____ 
Baseline'  7  15  32  79  167 
Entry source = hospital  6  13  27  62  129 
Gender  = female  7  16  35  89  191 
Severe ADL limitation = present  6  14  30  70  147 
Age = 85  8  17  38  101  220 
B. Days in Nursing Home, for Admissions Covered Initially by  Medicaid 
Specification 
Percentile 
loth  25th  50th  75th  90th 
Baseline'  16  38  114  298  > 549 
Entry source = hospital  15  36  105  270  > 549 
Age = 85  16  39  116  305  > 549 
Gender = female  20  55  166  514  > 549 
Severe ADL limitation = present  15  35  103  264  > 549 
C. Days in Nursing Home, for Admissions Covered Initially by Other Payment Sources 
Percentile 
Specification  loth  25th  50th  75th  90th 
~~ 
Baseline'  12  33  97  203  336 
Entry source = hospital  12  32  94  196  325 
Age = 85  12  31  92  193  320 
Gender = female  16  53  144  29 1  47  1 
Severe ADL limitation = present  11  26  77  166  277 
'Baseline characteristics are as follows: entered nursing home from community; age 75; male; no 
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predicted quantiles associated with a change in the value of one covariate at a 
time. To  compare the baseline cases for the three forms of  financing, figure 
8.1 presents plots of the survivor functions associated with the three cases. 
The results in table 8.3 and figure 8.1 demonstrate that there are striking dif- 
ferences in duration by payer source,  with Medicaid  admissions having the 
greatest  length  and  Medicare  the  shortest.  Table 8.3 indicates that  women 
have longer nursing home stays than men, especially if  Medicaid  or “other 
source” initially finances the stay. Age is associated with an increased length 
of stay for Medicare admissions, but not for the other payment sources. 
Just as the parameter estimates indicate that the presence of a severe ADL 
impairment and the source of  admission could be excluded from the model, 
table 8.3  shows that the predicted  duration varies little with changes in these 
variables.  Severe ADL impairment was of borderline significance in the du- 
ration analyses for other payment source, and table 8.3C shows that duration 
is shorter for persons  with  a severe ADL impairment than  for the baseline 
case, if payment comes from “other source.” The overall lack of explanatory 
power for ADL impairment  may be somewhat surprising,  but is consistent 
with our earlier finding that severe ADL impairment was a statistically signif- 
icant predictor of  mortality and of the probability  of admission to a nursing 
home but not of the probability of discharge from a nursing home (Garber and 
MaCurdy  1990). As we will see in the next section, the current analysis con- 
firms that, while the presence of a severe ADL impairment has little effect on 
duration,  it  is associated with  the  probability  that  a spell  will terminate in 
death. 
-  Medicare  +  Medlcald  +  Othersource 
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Fig. 8.2  Hazard functions by payment source 
The hazard functions for each payer type, plotted in figure 8.2,  demonstrate 
the nature of duration dependence. Medicare nursing home spells, but not the 
others, would be expected to show fluctuations in the value of the hazard be- 
cause of  the  changes in  the  effective price  induced by the  Medicare  rules. 
Private pay  patients  would  not be expected to experience changes in  price 
during a nursing home admission unless they  were approaching the spend- 
down  to Medicaid  eligibility.  Medicaid  patients  face  zero price,  so rapid 
changes in hazard rates are not expected.' 
Although the hazard functions are qualitatively similar for persons with dif- 
ferent characteristics, the magnitude of the rate is variable. Furthermore, there 
are striking differences in hazards according to payer type. At baseline char- 
acteristics there is a broad peak in the hazard rate between days 10 and 40. As 
table 8.3  reveals, this early peak in the hazard corresponds to a relatively short 
length of  stay. Half the Medicare admissions have ended by thirty-two days, 
and three-fourths have ended by seventy-nine days. 
1. Particularly for Medicaid patients, transfer to a hospital or discharge to the community is not 
simply a demand phenomenon, so other factors may be responsible for fluctuations in the hazard 
rate. Nursing homes can influence discharges and may have special incentives for doing so when 
Medicaid is the payer. Gertler (1989) has argued that, while private pay patients can be charged 
more than Medicaid reimburses, Medicaid patients are admitted because regulations prevent nurs- 
ing homes from discriminating on the basis of payment source. There is typically excess demand 
for Medicaid-financed beds. One implication of  Gertler's argument is that nursing homes have an 
incentive to discharge or transfer  Medicaid patients whenever there is an  increase in demand 
among private payers or when health deterioration increases the cost of  caring for a Medicaid 
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Medicaid hazard rates are lower than Medicare hazards, corresponding to 
the much longer average length of stay for a Medicaid admission. Medicaid 
hazards have an attenuated peak at about twenty days (possibly reflecting dual 
coverage).  As the Medicaid  survivor function shows, the probability  of re- 
maining in the nursing home declines slowly and smoothly with time. Even 
after a hundred days, more than half the Medicaid admissions remain in the 
nursing home; the seventy-fifth percentile for Medicaid is 298 days at baseline 
characteristics and exceeds a year for women. 
Hazard rates for admissions reimbursed by private funds exhibit  an early 
peak, at about two weeks, but the peak is not nearly as high as for the Medi- 
care admissions. At later times, the hazard rate remains higher than for Med- 
icaid patients (but lower than for Medicare). For example, at the baseline Val- 
ues of the variables, the hazard rate under “other insurance”  is .0065 at one 
hundred days, but only .005 for Medicaid. The Medicare hazard rate, in con- 
trast, is about .012 at one hundred days. 
Despite the somewhat higher hazard rates, spells paid by “other payer” are 
only slightly shorter than Medicaid spells, as the survivor functions (fig. 8.2) 
suggest. 
8.4.3  Estimation Results for Exit Probabilities 
To estimate the probabilities Pr(n  -+  i)  defined by (9,  we apply standard 
maximum likelihood procedures in a multinomial logit framework to compute 
values for the parameters p appearing in specification (7). Our sample consists 
of observations on the residency status of an individual immediately following 
the termination of a nursing home spell. The values of the variables Z are fixed 
at the time of entry into the spell. As an arbitrary normalization,  the coeffi- 
cients in the transition  to death are set equal to zero, so reported coefficient 
estimates measure Pr(n -+  h)  and Pr(n + c) relative to Pr(n +  d). 
Table 8.4 presents parameter estimates and standard errors associated with 
the exit probabilities. The variables incorporated in Z include polynomials in 
the spell-length quantity T and many of the same variables introduced  in the 
duration analysis presented above. The intercepts and the polynomial terms T, 
T~,  and T~  are fully interacted with the three dummy variables MEDICAID,  MED- 
ICARE,  and OTHER,  which identify payment source at the time of  admission 
into the institution.  Such a parameterization  allows patterns  for the relation 
between spell lengths and exit probabilities to vary by payment source. Inter- 
actions between SVADL and the three financing dummies also permit separate 
influences  for severe ADL limitations.  The inclusion  of the  variables  AGE, 
 AGE^,  and SEX control for demographic characteristics. Likelihood ratio tests 
at conventional levels of significance imply acceptance of the restriction that 
the associations of demographic characteristics with exit probabilities do not 
vary by payment source. Additional hypothesis tests indicate that the ENTRY 
variable, which describes residency status prior to institutionalization, is not 
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Table 8.4  Parameter Estimates of the Exit Probabilities (standard errors in 
parentheses) 
Variable  Pr(n-tc)lPr(n-td)  Pr(n-*h)lPr(n-+d) 
CONSTANT  X  MEDICARE 
SPELL LENGTH  x  MEDICARE 
SPELL  LENGTH^  x  MEDICARE 
SPELL  LENGTH^  x  MEDICARE 
CONSTANT  X  MEDICAID 
SPELL LENGTH  X  MEDICAID 
SPELL  LENGTH^  x  MEDICAID 
SPELL LENGTH’  X  MEDICAID 
CONSTANT  X  OTHER 
SPELLLENGTH  X  OTHER 
SPELL LENGTH’  x  OTHER 
SPELL LENGTH3 X  OTHER 
SVADL  X  MEDICARE 
SVADL  X  MEDICAID 
SVADL  X  OTHER 
AGE 
 AGE^ 
SEX 
,516020 
(9.643600) 
,032360 
( .010600) 
-  ,000242 
(.oooO85) 
,000000 
(.000000) 
,316500 
(9.655840) 
,009850 
( ,019530) 
-  ,000127 
(.OOOl62) 
.000000 
(.-) 
1.487810 
(9.805370) 
.O  19757 
(.030393) 
-  .000097 
(.000291) 
.m 
(.OC@C@l) 
-  .640180 
(.  334980) 
,049353 
(.524721) 
,342004 
(.621751) 
.033890 
(.  24  1234) 
(.001493) 
(.219186) 
-  .000356 
-  ,592309 
-  1.445786 
(9.659844) 
.009396 
(.011443) 
-  .oooO59 
(.000l00) 
,000000 
(.-) 
-  .711479 
(9.676097) 
,009584 
(.018069) 
-  .000120 
(.000152) 
,000000 
(.000000) 
-  1.469308 
(9.821  161) 
.028884 
(.030842) 
-  .000168 
(.000293) 
,000000 
(.OC@C@l) 
-  ,238538 
(.347173) 
.513870 
(.473625) 
,629457 
(.65  1  149) 
,068363 
( .24  1742) 
-  ,000516 
(.00  1497) 
(.22  10 17) 
-  ,402908 
8.4.4  Implications of the Findings for Exits 
To  develop the implications of  the empirical results given above for the 
relation between financing sources and the circumstances under which a nurs- 
ing home spell ends, table 8.5 reports predictions for the exit probabilities for 
different values of the covariates. The results in table 8.5 imply that, for 75- 
year-old men, the presence of  severe impairment in at least one activity of 
daily living raises the probability that a Medicare-paid nursing home admis- 
sion will terminate in death. The association between severe impairment and 
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Table 8.5  Exit Probabilities, by Duration, Characteristics, and  Payment Source 
A. From Hospital, Age 75, Male, No Severe ADL Impairment 
MEDICARE  MEDICAID  OTHER SOURCE 
SPELL 
LENGTH  COMMUNITY  HOSPITAL  DEATH  COMMUNITY  HOSPITAL  DEATH  COMMUNITY  HOSPITAL  DEATH 
5  ,4239  ,3482  .2279  ,2461  ,5736  ,1802  ,6369  .2256  ,1375 
10  ,4530  ,3362  ,2108  ,2480  ,5775  ,1745  ,6387  .2355  .1258 
15  ,4798  ,3246  ,1956  ,2495  ,5808  ,1697  ,6397  ,2448  ,1155 
25  ,5265  ,3033  .1702  ,2517  ,5857  ,1625  .6403  ,2613  .0984 
50  ,6038  ,2656  ,1306  ,2530  ,5906  ,1564  ,6386  .2907  ,0707 
75  ,6348  ,2505  .  1  147  ,2499  ,5872  ,1630  .6395  ,3047  .0559 
100  ,6315  ,2542  ,1143  ,2437  .5769  ,1794  .6457  ,3061  ,0482 
B. From Hospital, Age 85, Male, No Severe ADL Impairment 
MEDICARE  MEDICAID  OTHER SOURCE 
SPELL 
LENGTH  COMMUNITY  HOSPITAL  DEATH  COMMUNITY  HOSPITAL  DEATH  COMMUNITY  HOSPITAL  DEATH 
5  .3885  .3487  ,2628  ,2238  .5700  ,2063  .a29  ,2333  ,1638 
10  ,4172  ,3384  ,2444  ,2257  S744  .I999  ,6057  ,2441  .1502 
15  .4440  .3282  .2278  ,2273  .5782  ,1945  .6077  ,2542  ,1381 
25  ,491  1  ,3091  ,1998  .2296  .5838  ,1866  ,6099  ,2720  .I  180 
50  ,5705  ,2742  ,1553  ,2310  .5893  ,1797  .6110  ,3039  .0851 
75  .a29  ,2600  ,1371  .2278  .5851  ,1871  .6132  .3  193  ,0675 
100  .5996  ,2637  ,1366  .22  15  .5732  ,2053  .6203  .32  13  ,0583 
C. From Hospital, Age 75, Female, No Severe ADL Impairment 
MEDICARE  MEDICAID  OTHER SOURCE 
SPELL 
LENGTH  COMMUNITY  HOSPITAL  DEATH  COMMUNITY  HOSPITAL  DEATH  COMMUNITY  HOSPITAL  DEATH 
5  ,5058  ,3438  .15M  ,3000  ,5785  ,1215  ,7080  ,2075  ,0845 
10  .5343  ,3281  ,1375  ,3016  ,581  1  ,1173  ,7072  .2158  ,0770 
15  ,5602  ,3135  ,1263  .3029  ,5833  .1139  ,7060  ,2235  .0705 
25  .6041  ,2879  ,1080  .3046  ,5866  ,1088  ,7029  ,2374  .0598 
50  .6741  ,2453  .0806  ,3055  ,5901  ,1044  ,6955  .2620  ,0426 
75  ,7010  .2289  .0700  ,3025  ,5883  ,1091  ,6932  .2733  ,0335 
100  .6978  ,2324  ,0699  .2971  .5820  ,1210  .6976  .2736  ,0288 
D. From Hospital, Age 75, Male, With Severe ADL  Impairment 
SPELL 
LENGTH 
5 
10 
15 
25 
50 
75 
100 
MEDICARE  MEDICAID  OTHER SOURCE 
COMMUNITY  HOSPITAL  DEATH  COMMUNITY  HOSPITAL  DEATH  COMMUNITY  HOSPITAL  DEATH 
,3080  ,3780  ,3140  ,2480  ,5792  .1729  ,6152  .2904  ,0943 
,3343  ,3707  ,2951  ,2498  ,5829  ,1673  ,6129  .3013  ,0857 
,3592  ,3631  .2777  ,2513  ,5861  .1626  ,6104  ,3114  ,0783 
,4042  ,3479  ,2478  .2534  .5909  .1557  ,6049  ,3291  ,0661 
,4837  .3179  ,1984  ,2546  .5956  .1498  ,5933  ,3600  ,0466 
.5175  .3052  ,1773  .2515  .5923  .1562  .5892  ,3742  ,0366 
.5  142  ,3092  ,1766  .2455  ,5824  ,1721  .5935  ,3750  ,0315 268  Alan M. Garber and Thomas E. MaCurdy 
However, for people whose nursing home stays are not  financed by  either 
government program, the presence of  a severe impairment in an activity of 
daily living is associated with a decreased likelihood of return to the commu- 
nity. 
As the parameter estimates imply, gender differences in  exits are signifi- 
cant. Table 8.5C presents results for a woman identical to the baseline case in 
every way except gender. Although the probability of hospital transfer does 
not appear to differ by gender, death is much less likely for a woman than for 
a man, and the probability of discharge to the community is somewhat greater. 
The  well-described heterogeneity of  nursing  home  admissions (Keeler, 
Kane, and Solomon 1981) suggests that the probability of each type of exit 
would  not  be  fixed  over  time.  Nursing  home  residents who  have  severe 
chronic disabilities and cannot live independently in the community are likely 
to terminate nursing home spells either by  death or by  transfer to a hospital. 
Such individuals predominate among the long-stayers. Discharges that occur 
early in a nursing home admission represent mixtures of people admitted for 
terminal care or for convalescence; one would expect few hospital transfers 
among early discharges. Whether death would be more likely for early dis- 
charges than for long-stayers depends in large part on the mix  of  terminal 
patients and convalescent patients among short-term nursing home stays. 
Although there is no relation between duration of the spell and exit proba- 
bilities for Medicaid patients, exit probabilities change with time for Medicare 
and “other source.” For Medicare patients, the probability of community dis- 
charge increases with duration, while the probability of hospital transfer and 
death both fall with duration. For admissions paid by other sources, the prob- 
ability of discharge to the community does not vary with duration of the ad- 
mission, but the probability of death declines, and the probability of hospital 
admission rises. Without knowing the subsequent pattern of utilization or the 
outcomes of hospitalization, it is difficult to ascertain the significance of the 
time trend of exit probabilities for “other source,” but it appears likely that a 
relatively high percentage of Medicare admissions for terminal care end early. 
Even for admissions of the same duration, predicted exit probabilities dem- 
onstrate striking variation with payer type. Return to the community is most 
likely if  other sources pay  for the nursing home admission. Death is most 
likely for Medicare patients, although Medicaid patients are also more likely 
to terminate a nursing home spell in death than are patients whose admissions 
are financed by other sources. Medicaid patients are the least likely to return 
to the community. These results and the duration findings together imply that 
Medicaid patients are likely to enter nursing homes for very long periods that 
terminate in either death or transfer to a hospital; our analyses do not enable 
us to say whether the hospital transfers ended in death, transfer back to a 
nursing home, or return to the community. These results make it seem un- 
likely that subsequent long-term care utilization by  Medicare or “other” pa- 
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8.5  Conclusions 
As planning  for and  financing long-term care have achieved new  promi- 
nence in policy circles, there is an urgent need for reliable estimates of the 
effect of insurance on long-term care utilization. We have attempted to take a 
step toward understanding the effect of insurance by measuring the association 
between  payer  type  and  utilization  within  a  high-risk  population  of  older 
Americans. One might argue that the absence of an association between type 
of coverage and utilization suggests that the demand for nursing home care is 
inelastic, an assumption implicit in much of the policy discussion regarding 
long-term care insurance.  Many advocates of  broader long-term care insur- 
ance coverage believe that widespread adoption of long-term care insurance 
would not increase the utilization of nursing homes. 
Our analysis finds that the distribution of the length of nursing home stays 
differs substantially among payer types, in ways that may not simply reflect 
selection. These differences are apparent even in a population of frail elderly 
individuals who lack social supports and are felt to have “unmet needs.” The 
differences also persist despite the control of the additional covariates incor- 
porated  into  our  model.  Although  our  study  was  not  designed  to assess 
whether the  differences  in nursing home duration by  payer are causal rela- 
tions, the persistence of strong relations between payer type and duration of 
nursing home admission despite the selection of the population and the control 
for additional covariates suggests that the incentive effects of the subsidy of 
nursing home care may play an important role in nursing home utilization. 
The results of the duration analyses reported here suggest that the payment 
source is strongly associated with the length of nursing home admissions. The 
covariates have a weak independent association with duration, at least within 
this population and in the time period studied, but some of them, such as the 
presence of  a severe ADL impairment, are associated with the type of exit. 
Medicare-financed  admissions are much shorter than  admissions funded by 
either Medicaid or “other” payment source, and there is a striking early peak 
in the hazard rate for Medicare admissions. 
The type of exit from the nursing home is also highly associated with the 
payment  source.  Exit probabilities reflect the “success” of  a nursing home 
admission,  and they  also give clues to future utilization  of  long-term care. 
Nursing home spells financed by  “other,” primarily private, payers last nearly 
as long as Medicaid admissions but are much more likely to end with return 
to the community.  The length of admission and payment source interact, at 
least for Medicare spells; the longer a Medicare patient is in a nursing home, 
the more likely is discharge to home.  Even long Medicare admissions seem 
short in comparison to Medicaid admissions and are much more likely to end 
in  return  to the community.  For the Medicaid  admissions,  the high  rate of 
discharge to hospitals and the high rate of  death are discouraging signs for 
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tients found that 14 percent of the patients discharged to a hospital died within 
forty-eight hours. Of  the remaining hospital transfers, 11 percent died in the 
hospital, and about 80 percent returned to a nursing home (Lewis, Cretin, and 
Kane 1985). 
Although the results of this study may be interpreted to imply that the de- 
mand for nursing home care is responsive to price, such a broad interpretation 
is premature. First, the population studied does not readily generalize to all 
elderly Americans. Channeling participants were selected because they were 
at high risk of entering a nursing home. The selection rule makes it difficult to 
generalize to all America’s elderly population, particularly since the criteria 
for “unmet needs” were not explicit. On the other hand, this population is 
inherently interesting. The Channeling population used nursing homes heav- 
ily. Many of them would have been unable to purchase private long-term care 
insurance because they  could  not  afford the premiums. In  addition, many 
would have been ineligible because of preexisting chronic diseases or because 
their conditions would not be covered by  many nursing home care policies. 
This is the group that is most likely to benefit from a federal program for long- 
term care insurance and would account for a disproportionate share of  pro- 
gram costs. 
Furthermore,  while the Channeling population is  special, the basic phe- 
nomena we describe may occur in similar fashion in the general population. 
There is some evidence that the outcomes of nursing home spells were more 
favorable in the Channeling population than among all nursing home spells. 
An analysis of the 1977 National Nursing Home Survey found that 49.7 per- 
cent of  Medicare admissions ended in discharge to the community, slightly 
less  than predicted in our analyses, at the mean duration of  fifty-six days. 
Similarly, “other” payment source and Medicaid admissions had a lower rate 
of  discharge to the community in  the  1977 National Nursing Home Survey 
than predicted in our analysis of Channeling. The analysis did not present the 
percentage who died, subsequent outcomes, or variation in discharge status 
with length of stay (Weissert and Scanlon 1985). 
A second difficulty arises from the endogeneity of payer source. Medicaid 
patients are likely to have been  chronically debilitated, and they may have 
been enrolled for substantial periods before entering the Channeling study. 
Other admissions must  meet  several requirements before  they  qualify for 
Medicare reimbursement. Inasmuch as there is a need for recent hospitaliza- 
tion, a relatively high death rate for Medicare admissions has little to do with 
causal effects of the payment system and much to do with the selection rules. 
Nearly all Medicare patients would have had either an acute illness or an acute 
exacerbation of  a chronic illness; the same phenomenon need not have been 
true for the other payers. 
Our results to date should be viewed as suggestive findings, not as defini- 
tive answers about insurance effects. As such, they make it clear that a com- 
plete understanding of nursing home utilization must be based on an adequate 271  Payment Source and Episodes of  Institutionalization 
characterization of paths leading to and from nursing homes and that it must 
account for multiple admissions. 
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Comment  Paul J. Gertler 
How to finance long-term care is being intensely debated at all levels of gov- 
ernment. At issue is whether to promote private insurance alternatives or ex- 
pand current entitlement programs. Further, there is substantial controversy 
over how to structure benefits under any alternative. Answers to these ques- 
tions clearly depend on the properties of the demand for long-term care. Alan 
M. Garber and Thomas MaCurdy make an important contribution to under- 
standing the determinants of  the use of  long-term care.  In  particular, they 
investigate the likely moral hazard properties of private long-term care insur- 
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ance. The authors argue that one possible argument as to why a private long- 
term care insurance market does not exist is moral hazard. 
Garber and MaCurdy also move the empirical modeling of health care de- 
mand out of a static framework into dynamic models. While theoretical work 
has  recognized  dynamics,  few  empirical  studies have  attempted  dynamic 
models. In addition, the empirical work is careful, and the authors go to great 
lengths to maintain maximum flexibility in their econometric specifications. 
The authors’ model the duration of a nursing home stay (conditional on the 
entry decision) and mode of  exit (home, hospital, or death). The first stage 
estimates hazard models separately by payment source (Medicare, Medicaid, 
and private pay). The major empirical issue is identification of  price effects. 
Nursing home patients can be categorized into three groups based on method 
of payment: private pay, Medicaid, and Medicare. The biggest source of price 
variation faced by patients is in the private pay market. However, Garber and 
MaCurdy argue that one cannot accurately estimate the true prices faced by 
private  pay  patients because of  hard-to-measure quality differences across 
nursing homes. For the remaining patients, there is limited cross-sectional 
price variation. Medicaid patients face zero prices, and all Medicare patients 
face the same copayments. However, the Medicare copayment changes over 
time, so Medicare patients face an increase in copayments during their nursing 
home stay. It is this variation that Garber and MaCurdy exploit to identify 
price effects. 
While Garber and MaCurdy have made an important contribution to iden- 
tifying price effects, there is some question as to how useful their estimates 
are. Medicare accounts for a very small percentage of  nursing home patient 
days and expenditures. The question boils down to whether Medicare price 
effects are representative of the price elasticity of demand by the majority of 
patients (Medicaid and private pay). Indeed, the three types of  patients are 
very different. 
Consider the differences between Medicare and non-Medicare patients. Al- 
most all Medicare patients have entered the nursing home after a hospitaliza- 
tion for some acute morbid event. Their nursing home stay is directly related 
to their illness, and their reason for being in a nursing home is typically reha- 
bilitative. Therefore, unless these patients die quickly, one would expect them 
to get better and return to the community. Medicare patients are short-stayers. 
Medicaid and private pay patients typically enter nursing homes because of  a 
long-term chronic problem that has so incapacitated them that they require 
help in their activities of  daily living. Their purpose for being in a nursing 
home is typically life-style maintenance, and they are long-stayers. Indeed, 
the data reported by Garber and MaCurdy support these differences. The ma- 
jority of Medicare patients enter nursing homes from hospitals, and their av- 
erage length of  stay is only fifty-five days (9 percent of the observations are 
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patients do not enter from a hospital, and their average length of stay is about 
125 days (70 percent of the observations are right censored). 
Now  consider the differences between Medicaid and private pay patients. 
One must be financially indigent to be eligible for Medicaid. Private pay pa- 
tients tend to be  wealthier and healthier than Medicaid patients. Medicaid 
status is commonly used as a measure of overall poor health in many studies 
in medical literature. Thus, one would expect Medicaid patients’ health to 
deteriorate much more quickly. Therefore, their stays are shorter, and they are 
more likely to exit via hospitalization or death. This is borne out in the data. 
Medicaid patients exit nursing homes faster than private pay patients: 75 per- 
cent of Medicaid patients exit via death or hospitalization, whereas 35  percent 
of  private patients exit via these methods. This is either because the initial 
state of health is poorer for Medicaid patients or because nursing homes qual- 
ity discriminate. 
What these differences suggest is that there is substantial underlying patient 
heterogeneity across patients in the three groups. If  price elasticities depend 
on health status,  wealth,  and  other demographic factors, then Garber and 
MaCurdy’s price elasticity estimates have limited usefulness. However, this is 
not the authors’ fault. It is a limitation of the available price variation in nurs- 
ing home data. Indeed, Garber and MaCurdy should be commended for find- 
ing a way to exploit the limited variation to obtain any estimates at all. 
A  more  fundamental problem concerns the extent to which  Garber and 
MaCurdy have estimated complete price elasticities. The paper attempts to 
measure the effects of  financial incentives on the demand for nursing home 
care by investigating length of stay conditional on the decision to enter a nurs- 
ing home. While modeling the duration of stay captures an important compo- 
nent of  demand, other elements need to be considered to obtain a complete 
alternative. Most obvious is the decision to enter a nursing home at all. Finan- 
cial incentives are likely to have a big effect on the initial entry decision. Not 
incorporating entry is somewhat surprising given Garber and MaCurdy ’s pre- 
vious work on entry decisions using the same data. Second, quality as mea- 
sured by the services nursing homes provide has been shown to respond dra- 
matically to the incentive structure of Medicaid reimbursement rules and the 
level of  private pay demand. Indeed, some nursing homes may respond to 
alternative financial incentive structures by adjusting quality instead of quan- 
ity (length of  stay). A complete picture of the demand for nursing home care 
needs to incorporate the entry decision and quality. 
A more complete model is important for examining the policy implications 
of the price effects. For example, the Rand health insurance experiment dem- 
onstrated that hospital entry and length of stay have very different price elas- 
ticities. If  this is the case for nursing homes, then moral hazard estimates 
depend crucially on the entry decision. Given their data, they can follow in- 
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ning with nursing home entry. By looking only at nursing homes, they have a 
selected sample and therefore cannot examine how policies that affect hospi- 
talization (diagnostic related groups, or DRGs) affect nursing home demand. 
Moreover, they cannot investigate how policies affect total medical care ex- 
penditures. In the end, we  are more interested in the total medical care ex- 
penditures than in just the nursing home component. 
A next step for Garber and MaCurdy would be to use the information on 
entire episodes of  illness (hospitalization, who does not enter a home, and 
what happens to patients pre-  and post-nursing  home stay). The could easily 
expand their dynamic framework to include hospitalization and other forms 
of care so as to get complete resource use model. In addition, resource use is 
modeled as an input into a health production function whose dependent vari- 
able is length of life. This more complete framework is easier to interpret from 
a welfare perspective. It would have individuals moving in and out of  four 
states: home, hospital, nursing home, death (absorbing state). Indeed, one 
could expand this to include living arrangements and get at the question of 
substitutability of formal and informal care. 
Let me turn now to the exit model. A discrete choice model conditional on 
length of  stay is specified. The possible modes of  exit are community (get 
better),  hospitalization (health deteriorates),  and death (health deteriorates 
further). This suggests that length of  stay is an input into the production of 
health. However, it seems to matter only for Medicare patients. It does not 
affect the other types of patients getting better. 
How should length of stay be interpreted in the exit model? Are short stops 
good or bad? The moral hazard story implies that short stays are good if pa- 
tients return home because fewer resources are used. Alternatively, long stays 
may be good if nursing home care substitutes for hospital care. If patients exit 
to death, then long stays (ignoring quality of  life) are better. What this again 
suggests is that the authors need a more complete theoretical model to guide 
the  empirical  specification.  Initial  health  conditions  are  determined  by 
whether and when to enter a nursing home. It would be easier to interpret 
results if they follow changes in health status over time. 
In summary, Garber and MaCurdy have made an important contribution to 
the understanding of the demand for nursing home care as well as moving the 
demand for medical care literature into dynamic models. I hope that they con- 
tinue to expand their work into more complete dynamic models. 